We investigated associations of deceased donor kidney offer acceptance with likelihood of the kidney being discarded, cold ischemia time at transplant (CIT), and likelihood of the kidney being exported outside the donation service area (DSA). We used kidney offers from donors in the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients July 1, 2015-June 30, 2016, and a stratified logistic regression to estimate odds ratios of acceptance for candidates wait-listed in a DSA. We estimated associations between these ratios and likelihood of discard or export and CIT at transplant. Approximately 0.50 kidneys were discarded per donor; lower DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios were associated with more discards (R=−0.20; P=0.006). For a median donor, the DSA with the highest acceptance ratio would place 0.12 more kidneys per donor than the DSA with the lowest ratio. Low acceptance ratios were associated with higher CIT (R=−0.23; P<0.001). For the median donor, CIT was 2.9 hours shorter for the DSA with the highest versus lowest acceptance ratio. Low acceptance ratios were associated with more exports (R=−0.43; P<0.001); the probability was 15% higher for a median donor in the DSA with the lowest versus highest acceptance ratio. Improving lowerthan-expected offer acceptance would likely reduce discards, CIT, and exports.
| INTRODUCTION
In the United States, approximately 100 000 patients are on the waiting list for a deceased donor kidney transplant. Nevertheless, 20% of kidneys recovered for transplant are discarded, including 55% of kidneys with a kidney donor profile index (KDPI) over 85%, indicating a "highrisk" donor. 1 The importance of decreasing the number of discarded kidneys cannot be overstated, given the long-term survival benefit of kidney transplant compared with dialysis, regardless of KDPI. 2, 3 For example, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) recently approved an operational rule to reduce the number of discarded kidneys with a KDPI over 85% by excluding transplants of such kidneys from evaluation of transplant program outcomes. 4 However, there is substantial variability in program-specific offer acceptance of easy-to-place kidneys across transplant programs, 5 which may lead to discards due to allocation inefficiency and longer cold ischemia time (CIT). Despite a desire to reduce the kidney discard rate, there has been no formal investigation of the relationship between offer acceptance and eventual kidney discard.
The effect of program-specific offer acceptance practices on allocation efficiency is difficult to evaluate due to the complicated nature of kidney allocation. Specifically, kidneys are recovered and allocated by the organ procurement organizations (OPOs) that serve each donation service area (DSA), not by individual transplant programs; that is, kidneys are allocated at the DSA level rather than the program level.
Intuitively, multiple programs must decline offers of a given kidney for it to accrue additional CIT or be discarded. Thus, the effect of individual programs and their offer acceptance behavior on allocation efficiency are difficult to isolate from each other. Specifically, multiple transplant programs are usually associated with the allocation process for each recovered kidney, and the programs responsible for eventual placement or discard depend on the decisions of other programs, which severely complicates an analysis of the association between allocation efficiency and offer acceptance of individual programs.
Previous offer acceptance research focused on demonstrating the variability in program-specific acceptance of "good" kidneys, 5 the association of offer acceptance in liver transplantation with wait-list mortality, 6 and the impact of Share 35 on liver offer acceptance. 7 Each of these studies focused on offer acceptance up to a certain point in the allocation process, after which accepted and declined offers were ignored. However, focusing on acceptance of early offers may fail to reveal the overall effect of offer acceptance practices on allocation efficiency. For example, patients at programs with exceptionally high offer acceptance may undergo transplant before they reach the top of the waiting list. Thus, offer acceptance of, for example, the first offer may fail to identify a program with high acceptance of offers later in a match run, which could indicate a willingness to accept and transplant marginal kidneys that are at risk of discard.
Rather than narrowly focus on acceptance of the first offer, we evaluated the association between the aggregated offer acceptance behavior of programs within a DSA (called DSA-specific offer acceptance) and metrics of allocation efficiency for kidneys recovered in the DSA. As kidneys are recovered and allocated by the OPOs that serve each DSA, DSA-specific offer acceptance provided better alignment with the kidney recovery and allocation process. Additionally, each recovered kidney has a single DSA-specific offer acceptance ratio that characterizes the offer acceptance practices of the local programs, which are given substantial priority in the kidney allocation system.
The specific metrics of allocation efficiency were the likelihood of the kidney being discarded, CIT at transplant, and the likelihood of the kidney being exported (ie, transplanted in a DSA different from the recovery DSA). 
| MATERIALS AND METHODS

| Kidney allocation and match runs
In the United States, deceased donor kidneys are allocated through a complicated system of rules that depend on donor quality, candidate 
| Kidney offer acceptance model
Discrete-time survival models estimated the probability of accept- offer acceptance ratios than they would if they had never received the offers. However, programs have the ability not to receive offers from donors with certain characteristics, and failure to properly screen offers may slow kidney allocation, increase CIT, and eventually lead to discard. Thus, this is a potential mechanism through which low offer acceptance could lead to discarded organs, and we did not want the model to remove the effect.
| Estimation of donation service area-specific offer acceptance ratios
Due to the extent of kidney offer data (over 1.5 million offers during a year), DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios were estimated after fitting the initial offer acceptance model. Specifically, the ratios were estimated by a random effect for the wait-listing DSA in a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with a logit link. The GLMM accounted for donor and candidate risk factors through an offset term equal to the linear predictors of the initial offer acceptance model. Data S1
provides a detailed description of the model fitting process, including the estimation of offer acceptance ratios.
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The characteristics of accepted and declined offers were summarized across important donor and candidate factors. Means and standard deviations described continuous variables, while percentages described categorical variables.
| Association between offer acceptance and metrics of allocation efficiency
Unadjusted 
| RESULTS
| Descriptive statistics of accepted and declined offers
Accepted offers were associated with younger candidates, lower estimated post-transplant survival, and lower candidate body mass index (Table 1) . Kidneys with KDPI <35% had higher acceptance rates than kidneys with KDPI >85%. DCD kidneys were slightly more likely to be declined, and kidneys with PHS increased infectious risk were slightly more likely to be accepted. Offers with fewer HLA mismatches were significantly more likely to be accepted, while higher offer numbers were associated with substantially lower acceptance.
| Association between donation service areaspecific offer acceptance and kidney discard
Low offer acceptance within a DSA was significantly associated with more discarded kidneys per donor recovered in the DSA (Figure 1 ). per recovered donor, while the DSA with the lowest offer acceptance was expected to discard 0.42 kidneys per recovered donor. Therefore, for a median donor, the DSA with the highest offer acceptance was expected to place 0.12 more kidneys per donor than the DSA with the lowest offer acceptance (P=0.006).
| Association between donation service areaspecific offer acceptance and cit at transplant
Low offer acceptance within a DSA was significantly associ- 
| Association between donation service area-specific offer acceptance and proportion of exported kidneys
Low offer acceptance within a DSA was significantly associated with a higher proportion of exported kidneys (Figure 3) . The average DSA exported slightly over 30% of kidneys recovered within it, and the average across DSAs ranged from about 15% to nearly 60% of recovered kidneys. The Pearson correlation between DSA-specific offer acceptance ratio and the proportion of exported kidneys was −0.43. For the median donor, the DSA with the highest offer acceptance ratio was expected to export 27% of recovered kidneys, while the DSA with the lowest offer acceptance ratio was expected to export 42% of recovered kidneys. Therefore, for the median donor, the difference in the proportion of exported kidneys was approximately 15% lower for the DSA with the highest offer acceptance than for the DSA with the lowest offer acceptance (P<0.001).
| DISCUSSION
Low offer acceptance in a DSA was associated with increased likelihood of kidneys being discarded, higher CIT at transplant, and increased likelihood of kidneys being exported, for kidneys recovered in the DSA. This is the first study to confirm the expectation of previous investigations of kidney offer acceptance. 5 Given the large variability in program-specific offer acceptance even for high-quality kidneys, 5 efforts to improve offer acceptance may help increase access to kidney transplant by reducing overall discards and improve transplant recipient outcomes by reducing CIT at transplant.
The offer acceptance practices of kidney transplant programs likely have the most important, and modifiable, effect on allocation efficiency. However, the complexity of the kidney allocation system severely impedes the ability to evaluate the effect of program-level offer acceptance practices on allocation efficiency. An alternative approach could, for example, investigate the association of eventual discard or
The association between DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios and the number of kidneys discarded per recovered donor. The "national average" is the average discard rate per donor across each DSA. The adjusted analysis presents the expected discard rate for a median donor across the spectrum of DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios. DSA, donation service area CIT of a kidney with program-specific acceptance of the first offer.
This approach may fail to reveal the entire effect of a given program's practices on the allocation system because aggressive programs may perform transplants in their patients before they reach the top of the waiting list. Separately, the variability of program-specific offer acceptance practices in a DSA may modify the effect of DSA-specific offer acceptance (or, equivalently, DSA-specific offer acceptance ratio). For example, a DSA with several extremely conservative programs but one aggressive program may be less burdensome on the allocation process than a DSA with only moderately conservative programs. Thus, further investigation of the relationships between DSA-specific offer acceptance, program-specific offer acceptance, and allocation efficiency could help identify the programs with the largest impact on allocation efficiency.
F I G U R E 2
The association between DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios and the average CIT at transplant in hours. The "national average" is the average CIT at transplant for donors recovered in each DSA. The adjusted analysis presents the expected CIT at transplant for a median donor across the spectrum of DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios. CIT, cold ischemia time; DSA, donation service area
The association between DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios and the proportion of exported kidneys. The "national average" is the average proportion of exported kidneys across each DSA. The adjusted analysis presents the expected proportion of exported kidneys for a median donor across the spectrum of DSA-specific offer acceptance ratios. DSA, donation service area
The effect of offer acceptance on allocation efficiency may depend on the quality of the donor. A preliminary analysis of KDPI subgroups (Data S1; Table S1 ) suggests a complicated interaction between offer acceptance, donor quality, and allocation efficiency.
For example, DSA-specific offer acceptance of low-KDPI kidneys had the largest absolute impact on CIT at transplant, despite a nonsignificant association with the likelihood of kidney discard or export.
In contrast, DSA-specific offer acceptance of high-KDPI kidneys showed a significant association with likelihood of kidney export but no significant association with CIT at transplant or likelihood of kidney discard. Donor quality may therefore modify the relationship between offer acceptance and metrics of allocation efficiency.
Interventions to improve offer acceptance may help kidneys across the entire spectrum of donor quality, although the components of allocation efficiency may change with donor quality. Regardless, further research is warranted regarding the relationship between offer acceptance, allocation efficiency, and potential efficacy of interventions across donor quality.
While kidney discard and allocation efficiency are important issues, significant variability in program-specific offer acceptance may affect access to kidney transplant and patient outcomes. 5 For example, liver transplant programs with below average acceptance of the first offer were associated with significantly higher wait-list mortality. 6 Similarly, programs with high offer acceptance may provide better access to kidney transplant than programs with lower offer acceptance, possibly leading to better outcomes for wait-listed candidates. Additionally, we found that low offer acceptance was associated with high CIT. This relationship may indicate that DSAs with low acceptance may have worse outcomes for recovered and transplanted kidneys because higher CIT is associated with worse post-transplant outcomes. 11, 12 Thus, further investigation is warranted regarding the relationships between DSA-specific offer acceptance, program-specific offer acceptance, and candidate outcomes.
Public reporting is a potential avenue toward improving kidney offer acceptance. For example, SRTR could integrate program-specific offer acceptance ratios for all donors and important subgroups into the program-specific reports, which are published on a public website twice a year. Additionally, programs could be provided with private detailed reports including two-and one-sided CUSUM charts, 13 offer acceptance ratios for donors with characteristics that can hinder placement (eg, DCD), and/or a detailed list of declined offers with the largest expected probability of acceptance and the eventual candidate(s) who accepted the kidney(s). Both approaches provide decision makers at kidney transplant programs with the information necessary to identify potential shortcomings and opportunities for improvement in program-specific offer acceptance practices. Public reporting for
OPOs may provide another avenue toward reducing kidney discard.
For example, SRTR could provide private reports to OPOs regarding program-specific offer acceptance of kidneys with, for example, over 100 offers. Thus, when a kidney becomes difficult to place, the OPO could, within the confines of OPTN policy, begin to expedite the process by offering the kidney to the programs most likely to accept it. A similar approach helps guide "rescue allocation" in Eurotransplant by offering kidneys at risk of discard to programs most likely to accept and transplant them. 14 While offer acceptance will not be integrated into regulatory evaluations, the impact of public reporting on offer acceptance should be monitored due to potential unintended consequences, which may have occurred after implementation of regulatory evaluations for post-transplant outcomes. [15] [16] [17] Deceased donor kidney supply varies substantially across DSAs, 1 and transplant programs that use suboptimal organs tend to have lower deceased donor supply relative to demand. 18 Medically appropriate offer acceptance decisions for wait-listed candidates could therefore differ in high-supply versus low-supply DSAs. These geographic disparities in the availability of deceased donor kidneys could therefore justify relatively low offer acceptance behavior.
However, the association between DSA-specific offer acceptance and metrics of allocation efficiency was present after an adjustment for supply and demand. Thus, improvements in offer acceptance behavior could increase transplants regardless of supply or demand in the local DSA.
Our analysis of offer acceptance, CIT, and kidney placement is subject to potential limitations. First, the offer acceptance model could only evaluate offers of eventually accepted kidneys to ensure that programs definitively rejected the offers (see Data S1 for further discussion). It is plausible, but not certain, that programs in DSAs with relatively high discard rates would have received offer acceptance ratios in our analysis that were higher than the offer acceptance ratios corresponding to all offers regardless of eventual placement. This scenario would suggest that our analysis may have underestimated the strength of the association between offer acceptance and kidney placement. Additionally, despite adjusting for important donor factors in kidney placement, the analysis remains subject to potential confounding from unmeasured or poorly collected risk factors, for example, cardiovascular risk factors for wait-listed candidates. Lastly, registry data cannot evaluate the daily practices of kidney transplant programs and, therefore, cannot assess the specific reasons for high or low offer acceptance.
In summary, we identified a significant association between offer acceptance practices in a DSA and kidney discard. Further efforts to improve offer acceptance practices may help eliminate unnecessary discards, reduce CIT, and thereby improve access to and outcomes of kidney transplant in the United States.
